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Summary

The claimant was transferred from incapacity benefit to employment and support allowance (ESA) from 3 November 2011. The claimant appealed about the amount of ESA he was awarded. That appeal (the ‘ESA appeal’) was allowed in August 2012, but the claimant had not attended the hearing, and was not told by the DWP that his ESA was increased, with arrears from 3 November 2011, until 25 October 2012. The increased ESA meant the claimant’s HB entitlement was reduced, and there was an overpayment from 3 November 2011; however, the local authority did not become aware of the increased ESA until March 2013. At that point, it decided that there was a recoverable overpayment for the period 3 November 2011 to 4 November 2012.

The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the claimant’s appeal, holding that the overpayment was caused by the claimant not informing the local authority that his ESA appeal had been allowed, and not by official error.

Judge Markus QC allowed the claimant’s further appeal, substituting a decision that the overpayment was not recoverable. The tribunal had erred in deciding that the overpayment was recoverable – in particular in not having regard to the fact that a substantial portion of the overpayment period was before the decision of the ESA tribunal, in not making a finding of fact about when the claimant actually became aware of the ESA tribunal decision, and in its approach to what constituted ‘official error’ (paragraphs 19–22). Regarding the latter, the judge approved the decision of Commissioner (as he then was) Williams in CH/943/2003 in holding that where an appeal tribunal finds a decision of the DWP or HMRC to have been wrong, that means that the original decision was an ‘official error’. The judge respectfully disapproved the contrary finding that had been made in CH/38/2008. It was the case that (applying regulation 100), as stated in CH/943/2003, the claimant could still have been found to have contributed to the official error, or to reasonably have been expected to have realised that his HB was being overpaid, so removing his defence against recovery of the overpayment. However, there was nothing in the present case to suggest that either of those applied (paragraphs 22–26).

On the facts of the case, the judge found that the claimant was not aware of the decision of his ESA tribunal until 25 October 2012, so could not have realised the overpayment was occurring before then. On the balance of probabilities, he would not have received the letter of that date until early the following week, and although he did not notify the local authority about it, he could not have done so to allow the authority to change his award before 4 November 2012. The result was that the entire overpayment in the period 3 November 2011 to 4 November 2012 was caused by official error and was not recoverable (paragraphs 31–34).

Summary

The claimant’s appeal concerned whether he was working for 30 hours a week for working tax credit (WTC). He had supplied evidence of this (receipts and table of hours worked) to HMRC. However, the HMRC response to the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal did not include that evidence or indeed (as subsequently conceded by HMRC to the Upper Tribunal) any documents relevant to the case. The tribunal proceeded on the assumption that claimant had not supplied the evidence, or enough evidence, when he claimed, and dismissed his appeal.

Judge Wikeley allowed the claimant’s further appeal and, with reference to the evidence now made available to him, substituted a decision that the claimant was entitled to WTC. There had been a breach of natural justice in that HMRC had failed to fulfil its obligation (under regulation 24(4)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008 No.2685) to provide the tribunal with copies of all documents relevant to the case, and the tribunal had been ‘erroneously lured into deciding the case on the basis that the claimant had allegedly failed to respond adequately to a letter sent to him by HMRC’. In fact, the claimant did not have the evidence as he had sent it to HMRC, and the letter sent by HMRC to the claimant had been sent not just after the original decision but after he had lodged his appeal. Judge Wikeley commented: ‘this is the stuff of Kafka’ (paragraphs 6-8).

In concluding comments, the judge reported that the HMRC submission to him on what had gone wrong included that its approach did not reflect the HMRC approach, in place since May 2014, to provide full details and relevant documents in responses to appeals. The judge said that left unclear why the pre-May 2014 approach was not compliant with the rules, what triggered the change and how that was affected. It also ‘remains to be seen’ whether the HMRC rule-compliant approach is reflected in further cases before the Upper Tribunal (paragraphs 16–18).

Note: Judge Wikeley has made a very similar decision about the same problem, this time concerning a termination of a tax credit award, in JR v HMRC (TC) [2015] UKUT 192 (AAC). There, he commented: ‘This is not the first time that the Upper Tribunal has had cause to make adverse comment on the standard of HMRC appeals responses filed with the First-tier Tribunal. The simple fact is that, as regards this aspect of its work, if HMRC were an educational establishment it would now be in special measures.’

Summary

The claimant’s husband died, and the funeral was held in June 2013. She completed a claim form for a funeral expenses payment from the social fund and said that she gave that to her jobcentre in September 2013, on a date that was within the three-month standard time limit for a claim, although she forgot to sign it. However, the claim form was not received at the DWP office responsible for processing the claim until October 2013. It was returned to her as ‘invalid’ for signing on 10 October, and the signed form was received on 16 October. However, the DWP then refused the claim on the basis that its receipt in October 2013 (ie, even the unsigned form) was outside the three-month time limit. The claimant’s eventual appeal was allowed by the First-tier Tribunal, who held that the date of claim was the date she gave the form to the jobcentre. The Secretary of State appealed, arguing that the claim was out of time as not received until October.

Judge Mitchell refused the appeal, holding that the tribunal had not erred in law. The claim, though initially defective, was received by the DWP inside the three-month time limit when it was given to the jobcentre, and the corrected claim was received within a month of the claim being advised of the defect, meaning it was treated as properly made in the first instance – ie, when it was received at the jobcentre (paragraph 41). The Secretary of State’s argument that the tribunal should have given him time to make representations about the relevance of date stamps on documents was rejected as he had chosen to present no evidence at all to the tribunal about arrangements for receipt of post in jobcentres, or of documents delivered in person to jobcentres or onward transfer of claim forms to benefit processing centres. In those circumstances, the tribunal was entitled to accept the claimant’s evidence about what had happened (paragraphs 36–37).

Under regulation 4(6)(b) of the Social Security (Claims and Payments) Regulations 1987, which is the relevant rule for a funeral expenses payment, the claimant must ‘deliver or send the claim to an appropriate office’. An ‘appropriate office’ is defined at regulation 2(1) as ‘an office of the Department for Work and Pensions’, including any postal address specified for that purpose. The jobcentre was an ‘appropriate office’ (paragraph 41(a)). Defective claims are dealt with under regulation 4(7). This applies where a claim is ‘defective at the date it is received at an appropriate office’. If a properly completed form is received within a month of the date on which the claimant is first advised of the defect, the claim is regarded as properly made ‘in the first instance’. The claimant satisfied that and so the date of claim was the date it was made ‘in the first instance’ – ie, at the jobcentre in September (paragraph 40(d) and (e)).

Summary

The claimant had requested an oral hearing of her appeal against a decision that she was not entitled to employment and support allowance as she failed the work capability assessment. She had been notified of the date of the hearing, but replied saying that she had a bad back, would not be able to attend and asking for a new hearing date to be fixed. The tribunal was given the request for the postponement but decided to proceed, and dismissed her appeal.

Judge Hemingway allowed the claimant’s further appeal and remitted the case to a new tribunal. The tribunal had erred in not adequately explaining its decision to proceed with the hearing. The tribunal said that it was satisfied that it was able to decide the matter without either party to the appeal being present and that it was fair and just to do so. Reference had been made by the tribunal to rules 2 and 31 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008 No.2685. But Judge Hemingway held that amounted merely to a ‘bare reference to the rules’ without any reasoning as to why it had so decided. There was no indication of any ‘balancing act’ regarding competing arguments and, in particular, it was not clear whether the tribunal indeed accepted that the claimant was unfit to attend but decided it could decide the case fairly and justly anyway, or whether it disbelieved her or whether it was unable to reach a view on fitness (paragraph 9).

The judge appreciated that a tribunal in this position would not have much to go on. But it should at least consider if it is able to reach a view as to whether a claimant is likely to be unfit to attend as, if it can do that, it is likely to have ‘considerable relevance’ in assessing what is fair and just. There may be cases where a tribunal could properly proceed notwithstanding unfitness to attend, but it would be rare for that not to be important. The error in the present case was the failure to explain whether it had reached a view on the matter (paragraph 10).

Comment from CPAG

Arguably, where it is accepted that a claimant is too ill to attend a hearing but wishes for another date to be set, a tribunal would need to have particularly strong reasons for deciding to proceed, given the requirement at rule 2(2)(c) of the Tribunal Procedure Rules to ensure as far as practicable that ‘the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings’.

Summary

The claimant had severe learning disability and autistic traits. She was unable to live on her own. When her carers moved in, the social work department agreed it would be better for managing the claimant’s condition if she had a separate lounge, and so what had been a downstairs bedroom was re-designated as a lounge. However, subsequently, the claimant was subject to a restriction under the ‘bedroom tax’ rules on the basis that the room was to be regarded as a ‘spare’ bedroom. The First-tier Tribunal allowed the claimant’s appeal, holding that it was ‘credible and reasonable’ that the claimant required her own living space because of her disability and was satisfied that the room had ceased to be a bedroom.

Judge Sir Crispin Agnew of Lochnaw Bt QC dismissed the further appeal of the Secretary of State. The tribunal had not erred in law. In his appeal, the Secretary of State cited the decision in SSWP v Nelson and Fife Council [2014] UKUT 525 (AAC) (the 'Nelson decision') as authority for the proposition that a claimant’s use of a room was irrelevant, and that what mattered was whether the room could be used as a bedroom, with the starting point being the landlord’s designation of the room, although that was not conclusive. 

However, in the present case, the judge pointed out that the Nelson decision actually said that the general test was whether the room could be used as a bedroom, and that further designation or choices by the occupant was ‘unlikely’ to be relevant, but that issues of designation could arise, for example, where the room had been converted into a bathroom or wet room (paragraphs 10–13). Therefore, the judge was of the opinion that ‘the Nelson decision goes no further than saying that normally the family designation and choice is not a relevant factor, but leaves open the question of whether or not there might be exceptional circumstances where re-designation might be appropriate’. On the facts of the present case, there was no reason why designation on professional advice for a mental health condition could not be such a circumstance. The judge also commented that if such capacity for re-designation was limited only to physical disablement, that would amount to unjustified discrimination – ie, against people with mental health conditions (paragraph 15).

Decision in brief

‘Scrutiny process’ involved certain claimants not required to attend a medical – decision that claimant had limited capability for work made on papers only – but the decisions did not involve the decision maker actually scoring the claimants under the descriptors regarding limited capability for work – this was in breach of the fundamental requirement to undertake such a scoring exercise in regulation 19(2) of the Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008 – result was decisions were invalid and of no legal effect – to extent that AC v SSWP (ESA) [2013] UKUT 229 (AAC) decided otherwise, that is not followed (paragraphs 4, 91 and 104) – First-tier Tribunal was capable of deciding that the decision was of no legal effect and must be set aside (claimants having appealed on basis of not having been put in the support group) (paragraphs 5 and 92)

Comment from CPAG

If the Secretary of State accepts Judge Wright’s decision, then presumably he must remake such scrutiny decisions made before 4 December 2013 so as to provide a score.

Decision in brief

Meaning of being ‘in receipt of’ a qualifying benefit – claimant incorrectly paid incapacity benefit – correct interpretation of regulation 9(1) and Case A of the Working Tax Credit (Entitlement and Maximum Rate) Regulations 2002 is simply whether the claimant had been ‘in receipt of’ a qualifying benefit – therefore, in this context, the fact that payment was made incorrectly was immaterial – caselaw on meaning of ‘payable’, and interpretation of Case C requiring a qualifying benefit to be ‘payable’ distinguishable as about different wording

Summary

The claimant was a German national who came to the UK in December 2011 to be nearer her daughter. The daughter was a Canadian national who was working in the UK, who was married to ‘Mr H’, a UK national and self-employed in the UK, but who had also, on three separate occasions, done some unpaid work in Greece and Germany, as a plumber and heating engineer for the International Bible Students Association. The claimant was financially dependent on her daughter and son-in-law (Mr H). The claimant’s right to reside for PC purposes was mainly reliant on an argument that she was the family member of a UK national who could be treated as if he were a European Economic Area (EEA) national, on the basis that he was ‘residing in a EEA state as a worker or self-employed person’ before returning to the UK. If that applied, then the claimant had a right to reside under regulation 9(2)(a)of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006 No.1003. The argument was rejected by the First-tier Tribunal.

Judge Ward rejected the claimant’s further appeal, holding that the tribunal had not materially erred in law. On the facts of the case, and with reference to the decision of the European Court of Justice (EUECJ) in Case C-456/12 O and B v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel (12 March 2014), he considered that the family member (Mr H) had not been ‘resident’ in Greece or Germany. He also considered that the tribunal had not erred in considering Mr H not to have been a ‘worker’ at the relevant times. Although it was not absolutely necessary to have been paid money, the fact that he was not in any sense better off as a result of performing the services, the brevity of the work and the fact that Mr H saw himself as a volunteer all suggested that his arrangements were not such as to make him a ‘worker’ (paragraphs 44–49). The judge also held that given that Mr H was a UK national, he did not count as an EEA national regarding his work in the UK, that there was no ‘lacuna’ in the law which required filling in this case, and that to accept that the denial of a right to reside to the claimant was somehow disproportionate would be ‘a large scale tearing-up’ of the relevant limitations in the law (paragraphs 54– 62). Although it was perfectly understandable that the claimant wished to be near her family, ‘that is not an unusual situation and it is not one for which the legislator has seen fit to provide’ (paragraph 62).

On the question of whether Mr H had been ‘resident’ in Greece or Germany, the facts included that he had only been in Greece or Germany for two or four weeks at a time, and was unpaid. In O and B, the EUECJ had looked at principles governing claims by ‘third-country’ nationals based on being family members of an European Union national who had exercised rights of freedom of movement and then sought to enforce her/his rights against her/his own member state. Although in the present case the claimant was German and so not a third-country national, O and B was relevant in that it held that such rights only arose where the ‘residence’ in another Member State had been ‘sufficiently genuine so as to enable the citizen to create or strengthen family life in that member state’ (paragraph 26). In the present case, the judge did not consider that Mr H’s brief periods in Germany and Greece ‘amounted to “residence” at all’ (paragraph 27). The judge rejected an argument that merely being present in the member state was sufficient, although it was not necessary to go as far as requiring ‘habitual residence’ (paragraph 32); rather, what was required was ‘a judgement of fact and degree as to whether the individual has lived in the EEA State in question with sufficient permanence, continuity, or at least some expectation of continuity, to warrant the conclusion that he “resided” there within the ordinary meaning of that word’ (paragraph 40).

Summary

The claimant was at the relevant time a child aged 7. He had learning difficulties, speech and communication problems and hyper-extensible knees and elbows. His claim for DLA (made by his mother) was refused. On appeal to the First-tier Tribunal he argued that he was entitled to the care component of at least the lower rate, and to the mobility component at the lower rate. In refusing the appeal, the tribunal held that he did not need substantially more care than that required by a child of his age who did not have a disability and, regarding the mobility component, that a child of his age would always require attention from a supervising parent or adult when crossing the road.

Judge Markus QC allowed the claimant’s further appeal and remitted the case to a fresh tribunal. The tribunal had erred firstly in holding that as the claimant was not dyslexic, the decision in KM v SSWP (DLA) [2013] UKUT 159 (AAC); [2014] AACR 2 (Bulletin 237, p12) did not apply. The tribunal was wrong to do this, held the judge, as ‘it is clear that KM is not limited to cases of dyslexia but applies to other cases of learning disability’ (paragraph 16). Further, KM gave guidance as to the correct approach to decision making for the care component rules (including for children) under section 72(1) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992. The tribunal had therefore not approached its task correctly. It did not identify what functional disability or impairment the claimant had, did not determine what bodily function that related to [KM refers to ‘the bodily function of the brain’], what assistance he required for that (including when at school), whether that counted as ‘attention’ and if so whether it was required for a significant portion of the day or frequently throughout the day (paragraph 18).

Further, the tribunal had erred in the approach to the extra test for children at section 72(1A)(b). That required that for a child there were either (under subsection (i)) care needs ‘substantially in excess of the normal requirements’ of a child of the same age, or (under subsection (ii)) substantial care needs ‘which younger persons in normal physical or mental health may also have’ but which persons of the claimant’s age in normal physical or mental health would not have. Endorsing comments in R(DLA) 1/05, the judge held that the tests were different in that subparagraph (ii) might apply where a claimant has substantial requirements which were ‘different to those of normally healthy children’, even though subparagraph (i) did not apply because the claimant’s requirements ‘are not substantially in excess of the requirements of those other children’ (paragraph 30). Applying that principle to a child claimant with developmental delay who needed help with reading, the judge said that ‘all young children require assistance with reading’, but ‘a child with developmental delay may require help of a type which is required by younger children in normal health’ but which was substantial and ‘different from the help required by children of the same age but is not substantially in excess of that help’. There might be cases therefore in which subparagraph (ii) applied to a child, even though subparagraph (i) did not (paragraphs 32–33). Similarly, the tribunal erred regarding the mobility component as KM held that a generally similar fact finding approach was required there. The extra test for children was at section 73(4A). The assistance required by the claimant may not have been limited to guidance in crossing the road. Also, the tribunal should then have identified the nature and degree of any guidance or supervision that was required, and whether it was ‘substantially more’ than that required by children of the same age in normal health, or whether such children ‘would not require such guidance or supervision’ (paragraphs 42–43).

See also our article on Universal credit, mental health and reasonable adjustments

Summary

The claimant was treated as possessing £7,000 of capital under the ‘notional capital’ rule. The circumstances were that the £7,000 had been withdrawn from the claimant’s account on the same day as a visit from a DWP customer compliance officer. In her appeal to the First-tier Tribunal, the claimant said that the money was used to repay her ex-partner money that she had borrowed from him, and that he had asked for the money to be returned because he had debts and his working hours had been reduced. She supplied evidence of this including a letter from her ex-partner. She said it was mere coincidence that the money had been withdrawn on the same day as the visit from the customer compliance officer. The tribunal dismissed the appeal, holding that the customer compliance officer had explained to the claimant the effect of the capital rules, and accepting the Secretary of State’s argument that the timing showed the claimant had deliberately deprived herself of the money in order to get more IS.

Judge Rowland allowed the claimant’s further appeal and substituted a decision that the claimant was not to be treated as possessing the £7,000 under the notional capital rule. On the facts and applying the relevant law, the judge considered that although the tribunal was entitled to find that the compliance officer’s visit precipitated the repayment of the debt, ‘the debt had to be paid and she had no legitimate choice but to pay it immediately’ (paragraph 16, emphasis in original). The judge pointed out that the claimant had provided the type of written evidence that had been held necessary in R(SB) 12/91, and the customer compliance officer had seen evidence of the building work that the claimant had said was financed by the loan. But it was worth emphasising that tribunals may need to investigate the facts in the thorough manner suggested in R(SB) 12/91, including (in cases involving repayment of a loan to a friend or relative) expecting the friend or relative to provide written and documentary evidence (paragraph 18).

The relevant law in this case was the notional capital rule at regulation 51 of the Income Support Regulations 1987 No.1967. In applying that, it was well established that the purpose of securing entitlement to a benefit or increasing the amount of that benefit need not be the dominant purpose behind the deprivation. In R(SB) 12/91, it was held that a person repaying debts that s/he was obliged to pay was not caught by the notional capital rule, but only where the relevant debt was ‘immediately payable’ (R(SB) 12/91 paragraphs 13 and 14, quoted at paragraph 8). In Jones v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2003] EWCA Civ 964, the Court of Appeal held that the question of why a person had deprived her/himself of capital was a question of fact, but that ‘if the payment is made in satisfaction of a debt, the fact-finder will not usually conclude’ that the purpose was to secure entitlement to benefit (Jones paragraph 52, cited at paragraph 10). In the present decision, Judge Rowland noted that the Court in Jones also made it clear that the fact that a debt was not immediately repayable did not automatically mean that the claimant was caught by the notional capital rule (paragraph 12). As a matter of ‘legal theory’, it was also true that even where the debt was immediately repayable the question of the purpose of the deprivation was still a matter of fact, but (noted Judge Rowland) the Court of Appeal did not suggest there was ‘any circumstance in which it would be reasonable to say that a person who had no choice but to repay a debt’ was caught by the notional capital rule (paragraph 13).

Summary

The claimant was a Latvian national who came to the UK in 2008. She did agency work from 2009, which initially was not registered under the worker registration scheme (WRS), following the extension of the application of the WRS for the period 1 May 2009 to 30 April 2011. Her work was eventually registered in August 2010 (it was agreed before the judge that it is not possible for that to have had retrospective effect). Her eventual claim for PC in 2012 was refused on the basis that she did not have the right to reside. The First-tier Tribunal said it did not have jurisdiction to consider her appeal, which was based on an argument that the extension of the WRS scheme in 2009 to 2011 was unlawful.

Judge Ward allowed the claimant’s further appeal and substituted a decision that the claimant was entitled to housing benefit. She had a right to reside on the basis that she was a ‘worker’ who had ‘ceased activity’ on reaching pension age or taking early retirement, having ‘resided’ the UK for at least three years, as provided for in regulations 5 and 15 of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006 No.1003. Firstly, the extension made to the WRS scheme in 2009 to 2011 was unlawful – so that when working in that period the claimant counted as a worker. The extension was not automatically unlawful, as the Treaty of Accession to the European Union of Latvia and the other so-called ‘A8’ states allowed for that ‘in case of serious disturbance’ of the labour market (paragraph 69). But the judge agreed that the restrictions on the labour market involved in such an extension must tackle the disturbance ‘proportionately’ (paragraphs 76–77), and considering the available evidence did not consider that test was met when the extension was made in 2009 (paragraphs 104–119).

Also, the three years’ ‘residence’ test in regulation 5 was, in the judge’s view, a test of ‘actual’ residence, not of ‘lawful’ residence (ie, as applies to the test for permanent right to reside after five years’ residence). It, therefore, did not actually matter whether the claimant had a right to reside in those years or not. In so holding, the judge declined to follow the decision to the contrary effect of Judge Jacobs in ID v SSWP (IS) [2011] UKUT 401 (AAC). But even if that was wrong, so that the three years’ residence had to be ‘lawful’, the judge considered that on the facts of the case in the relevant times the claimant in fact had a right to reside either as a worker (as above) or as a jobseeker, including having a ‘genuine chance of being engaged’ while a jobseeker (paragraphs 122–135).

Note: this decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal and subsequently to the Supreme Court, see our caselaw summaries Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Gubeladze [2017] EWCA Civ 1751 and Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Gubeladze [2019] UKSC 31.

Summary

The claimant had various health conditions including significant visual impairment. He failed the work capability assessment, having been scored nil points. The First-tier Tribunal allowed him nine points under Activity 8(c). In his further appeal to the Upper Tribunal, the claimant argued that he should be scored 15 points under Activity 8(b) – ie, ‘cannot safely complete a potentially hazardous task such as crossing the road, without being accompanied by another person, due to sensory impairment’. The tribunal had not applied that descriptor, based on its conclusions from the claimant’s evidence that he was able to cross the road using a zebra crossing but would not go somewhere unfamiliar.

Judge Wikeley allowed the claimant’s appeal and remitted the case to a new tribunal for more findings of fact. The tribunal had erred in two respects. Firstly, it had failed to make findings about the variability of the claimant’s problems with vision under different lighting conditions (bearing in mind the overall test of ability to perform the specified activity with ‘reasonable regularity’), an issue which was indicated in the evidence before the tribunal. Secondly, the tribunal had concentrated exclusively on the claimant’s ability to cross the road using a zebra crossing, and in so doing had not applied the wording of descriptor 8(b) correctly (paragraphs 17–18).

Specifically, in descriptor 8(b) crossing the road was (because of the use of the words ‘such as’) ‘simply one illustration’ of a potentially hazardous task, and ‘not an exclusive and exhaustive definition’ (paragraph 18). Therefore, the tribunal had erred in treating the test of crossing the road as the sole context, to the exclusion of others – the judge suggested other potential illustrations might include walking alone on a country lane where there is no footpath, walking round a shop or workplace where there may be boxes or other obstacles at floor level, or perhaps even a busy pedestrian route with bustling crowds (paragraph 5).

Even in the context of crossing road, the tribunal had erred in focusing on the claimant’s ability to use a zebra crossing. The test was whether the claimant could ‘safely cross the road without being accompanied’, not ‘cross the road by a zebra crossing without being accompanied’. A zebra crossing could not be regarded as an ‘aid’ which could be taken into account for this purpose, as such an aid must be something which the claimant can take about with him (paragraph 20).