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Summary

The claimant was unable to walk but did have some ability to use a manual wheelchair, albeit not over uneven ground outdoors. However, in the mobilising descriptor for the work capability assessment, he scored only nine points (under descriptor 1(b)) for inability to mount or descend two steps. That was adopted by the First-tier Tribunal. The claimant’s further appeal included an argument that he should have scored 15 points under descriptor 1(a)(ii) for inability to ‘repeatedly mobilise 50 metres within a reasonable timescale…’, as that did not specify that the test only applied on level ground. The Secretary of State argued that the tribunal had not erred in reading into the test the condition that it applied on level ground, as the test at subparagraph (ii) followed on from that in subparagraph (i), and that did specifically refer to an inability to mobilise ‘on level ground’.

Although Judge White considered that the tribunal had erred for making inadequate findings of fact and giving inadequate reasons (and therefore remitted the case to a fresh tribunal), he held that it had not erred in its approach to descriptor 1(a)(ii). He held that the Secretary of State must be right that the test there applied on level ground, on the basis that the ‘only possible interpretation’ must be that it is on the same terms as the primary test at 1(a)(i), which does specify level ground (paragraph 30).

The judge also reproduced some evidence, submitted by the Secretary of State, about the provision of wheelchairs under the Access to Work scheme. Although not relevant on the facts of the current case (where the appellant already had his own wheelchair), the judge thought it worthwhile to do this, given the comments of the Upper Tribunal in SI v SSWP (ESA) [2014] UKUT 308 (AAC) [now reported as [2015] AACR 5] that if the Secretary of State was able to say that any claimant otherwise without access to a manual wheelchair could get one via the Access to Work scheme where necessary for employment, the question of availability of manual wheelchairs would cease to be an issue in most cases. However, in the present case the Secretary of State said: ‘The UT judges referred to the Access to Work Scheme as a possible source of assistance with a manual wheelchair. However, that is not the case…The Scheme would not normally be used to fund purchase of a manual wheelchair, as it is expected that this would be provided by the appropriate wheelchair services in the area…However it could fund the extra costs of a specialist wheelchair if appropriate. Where assistance with travel to work is required, and no other method of transport is available, the Scheme might assist with the cost of taxis.’

Comment from CPAG

The Secretary of State’s evidence about the Access to Work scheme would appear to make it more likely that the availability of manual wheelchairs may be an issue in appropriate cases, where there is no evidence of the wheelchair being provided via other schemes.

Summary

The claimants were both subject to a reduction in their eligible rent under the so-called ‘bedroom tax’ – ie, for alleged ‘under-occupation’ of accommodation, as provided for by regulation B13 of the Housing Benefit Regulations 2006 No.213. Their appeals to the First-tier Tribunal were successful, on the grounds that the rooms that were the subject of the reduction could not be classified as bedrooms because their floor areas were not large enough. In particular, the tribunal accepted arguments based on the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987 relating to overcrowding, which on the facts would have meant that rooms were too small for occupation as a bedroom by an adult.

In the Upper Tribunal, a three-judge panel allowed the Secretary of State’s further appeals. The tribunal had erred in giving inadequate reasons for the decisions (paragraph 48). Also, however, the tribunal had erred in its use as a determinative test of the statutory overcrowding provisions of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987 and Annex C of Housing Benefit Circular A4/2012 insofar as it allegedly supported such an approach. The tribunal had been wrong in law to hold that ‘under-occupancy’ could be seen as the ‘flipside of overcrowding’, as the 1987 Act and regulation B13 of the Housing Benefit Regulations were very different in intent and operation. The tribunal had also erred in holding that if parliament had intended that the overcrowding provisions be ignored, the legislation would have said so explicitly – that was counter to the well-established approach that when parliament uses familiar and ordinary English words (such as ‘bedroom’) it does not define them, and it intended to allow decision makers to take account of ‘all relevant circumstances on a case by case basis’ (paragraphs 50–54).

However, the judges did not go so far as to say that the size of a room was not relevant to the judgement of whether it was a bedroom, or that regard could not be had to the overcrowding provisions: they could act as ‘cross-checks’ or ‘warning bells’ that the room may be too small (paragraph 55). The judges considered that the correct approach was to consider use, or potential use, of the room as a bedroom by an adult or a child, that the choices of how the room should actually be used was unlikely to have an impact, and that the test was ‘essentially the assessment of a property when vacant; rather than how it is actually used from time to time’. However, issues could arise where a room had been converted into bathroom or wet-room and from questions like what should be the living/dining areas of a property (paragraphs 27–9). The starting point was the description by the original and later landlords of the room. Also, factors including size, access, natural and electric lighting, ventilation and privacy were all relevant. The argument advanced by the Secretary of State that a bedroom was any room big enough to accommodate a single bed even if it would touch a wall or an outward opening door was ‘absurd’ (paragraphs 30–33).

Summary

The claimant became entitled to contributory ESA in 2009. That award was terminated from 26 August 2011 following a decision that she did not have limited capability for work. The claimant appealed against that decision, got an award of contributory ESA pending the appeal, and on 22 March 2012 a First-tier Tribunal (‘the first tribunal’) allowed that appeal, which held both that she had limited capability for work and limited capability for work-related activity – ie, was entitled to the support component of ESA. In April 2012 the DWP (apparently unaware of the decision of the first tribunal) notified the claimant that her award of contributory ESA would terminate on 30 April 2012, because of the time-limiting provisions. The claimant ‘claimed’ income-related ESA using the enclosed Form ESA 3 but, although her contributory ESA was reinstated when it was acknowledged that she was in the support group, arrears of income-related ESA were awarded only from 30 April 2012.

The claimant appealed, on the basis that ESA was one benefit, and that the requirement to make separate ‘claims’ of the income-related and contributory allowances was merely an administrative convenience. The First-tier Tribunal (‘the second tribunal’) dismissed that argument and held that entitlement to income-related ESA arose only from the date of the alleged ‘claim’ of 30 April 2012.

Judge Rowland allowed the claimant’s further appeal. The second tribunal had erred in law in holding that ESA was not a single benefit, holding that separate claims for income-related and contributory ESA were necessary, and in not recognising that the decision of the first tribunal meant that the claimant’s award of ESA should have been increased so as to award income-related ESA from 26 August 2011 (paragraphs 12–17). Specifically, held the judge, ‘if a claimant is entitled to both a contributory allowance and an income-related allowance, there is still only one amount of employment and support allowance payable…’ (paragraph 12); also, the practice of giving claimants an opportunity to ‘claim’ either both or only one allowances merely provided the opportunity (if only one were chosen) to waive the need to consider both allowances, and ‘the legislation does not actually contemplate there being a claim for only one element of the allowance’ (paragraph 13). In this case, the effect of the decision of the first tribunal on 22 March 2012 was that the claimant was entitled to the support component in both contributory and income-related ESA, and regarding the latter, that meant she was entitled to an enhanced disability premium (paragraph 20). As that decision was effective from 26 August 2011, the inclusion of the premium had the effect that she was entitled to income-related ESA as well as contributory ESA from that date (paragraphs 18 and 21).

Summary

In these joined cases before a three-judge panel of the Upper Tribunal, the main issue concerned the weight to be given to an official medical report about the work capability assessment, where that report was written by a physiotherapist but concerned the mental health descriptors. In particular, the judges considered the correctness of the approach taken by Judge Mark in JH v SSWP (ESA) [2013] UKUT 269, where he held that in such a case the opinions of the physiotherapist had ‘no probative value whatsoever’ – ie, were automatically to be accorded little or no weight by the First-tier Tribunal.

Mr Justice Charles, Judge Lane and Judge Knowles QC held that those comments of Judge Mark in JH v SSWP were actually obiter (not necessary to the main reasoning of the decision) but that, in any case, they were wrong to the extent that they purported to create a rule of law or a starting point that official evidence from physiotherapists in a mental health case were of no probative value or likely to have little probative value and were to be accorded little or no weight (paragraph 33). In their reasons, the judges referred to the fact that the statutory scheme authorised ‘healthcare professionals’, which include physiotherapists, to carry out assessments, and that tribunals had to be free to evaluate evidence without being fettered in the way that the comments in JH v SSWP had suggested (paragraphs 34 and 37). Also, the training provided to all healthcare professionals included mental health assessment, and although that training was subject to review, the independent reviews of the work capability assessment had not criticised the performance of physiotherapists in mental health cases (paragraph 36).

More generally, the judges said that in assessing the weight of any medical report, the First-tier Tribunal should consider the level of the author’s expertise and the knowledge of the claimant possessed by the author (paragraph 38). In the present cases, the tribunal had erred in giving no reasons for explaining why it had attached no weight to evidence from the GP of one of the claimants, and in failing to consider the case ‘in the round’ – ie, by considering how an award of points in one descriptor might suggest that points should also be scored in other descriptor (paragraphs 44–47). Also, the tribunal had erred in treating the claimant’s engagement in the ESA claim process and the tribunal hearing as evidence in itself that she could cope with social engagement: that ‘snapshot approach’ ignored evidence other evidence and whether the claimant could cope with social engagement with ‘reasonable regularity’ (paragraph 56).

Summary

The claimant was in receipt of child benefit. She had been instructed in the payment advice notes that she needed to advise HMRC when her son left full-time education. However, when her son left full-time education in January 2012 she did not do so, as she had subsequently been told by an ‘under 18s adviser’ at her local Jobcentre Plus office that she did not need to, as she would remain entitled to child benefit until May 2012. HMRC eventually decided that she had been overpaid child benefit in March and April 2012, and that the overpayment was recoverable from her as it was caused by her failure to disclose to it the fact of her son leaving education. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the claimant’s appeal, holding that the payment advice letter required disclosure to HMRC, and disclosure to Jobcentre Plus did not suffice.

Judge Wright upheld the claimant’s further appeal, substituting a decision that the overpayment was not recoverable from the claimant, as she had not failed to disclose. That was because, as erroneously overlooked by the tribunal, the instruction to disclose to HMRC had been qualified by the subsequent advice from the under 18s adviser at the Jobcentre. On the facts of this case, which included that HMRC did not dispute that the adviser was a person with authority to make such a qualification, that was sufficient to remove the duty to disclose to HMRC.

Regarding the possibility of qualification of the instructions in the payment advice notes, the judge had in mind R(A) 2/06 and the decision of Upper Tribunal Judge Ward in WW v HMRC (CHB) [2011] UKUT 11 (AAC). The tribunal had erred in failing to consider this. The claimant, having been given the instructions in the payment advice notes, had originally been under an obligation to disclose to HMRC, under regulation 23(2) of the Child Benefit and Guardian’s Allowance (Administration) Regulations 2003 No.492. The judge accepted that that obligation required disclosure to HMRC, and ordinarily failure to comply with that would lead to a failure to disclose (paragraph 13). However (as pointed out in WW v HMRC (CHB)), that obligation could be varied by oral representations by those with authority, or the apparent authority, to do so (paragraph 15). On the facts of this case, which included HMRC not disputing that the under 18s adviser had the authority to advise the claimant about her child benefit entitlement and when disclosure to HMRC need not be made, the judge accepted that the advice at the jobcentre acted to qualify the instruction given to the claimant in the payment advice notes, to one that she did not need to notify HMRC of her son leaving full time education until the end of May 2012 – which she did do. Consequently, she did not breach the modified obligation she was under, and the overpayment was not recoverable from her (paragraph 16).

Summary

The claimant was refused bereavement benefit on the basis that her marriage to the deceased husband in 1986 (in the UK) was not valid. That was because he was considered by the First-tier Tribunal to have already been validly married sometime between 1956 and 1960, and that his subsequent attempt to divorce that first spouse was invalid, with the result that he remained married to her and therefore could not lawfully have married the claimant. At the time both of his alleged first marriage and purported talaq divorce, the now deceased husband was resident in the UK, while his first wife was resident in Pakistan. Both procedures had been conducted over the telephone.

Judge West allowed the claimant’s further appeal, substituting a decision that she was validly married to the deceased in 1986, and was entitled to bereavement benefit on his death. The tribunal had erred in holding that the deceased had been lawfully married to someone else between 1956 and 1960.

The Secretary of State conceded that the purported earlier marriage, made by a transnational telephone call, was not valid and so that the deceased was consequently free in 1986 to marry the claimant, and that she was entitled to bereavement benefit (paragraph 11). The judge considered that concession rightly made. His full reasons were to include that the purported marriage ceremony between the deceased and the alleged spouse in Pakistan was ‘not valid under English law’ and even supposing it were valid under the law of Pakistan, ‘a marriage conducted in two countries would have to be valid under the law of both countries to be valid under English law’ (paragraph 13). It was common ground that the formal validity of a marriage is to be determined exclusively according to the law of the place where it is celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). The judge considered that the formal validity of a telephone marriage was to be determined according to the laws of the countries of which both parties are physically present ‘with the result that a telephone marriage celebrated whilst one of the parties was in England will not be valid since telephone marriages are not valid in this country’ (paragraph 29). In so holding, he considered that a decision by the Scottish Court of Session, A v K [2011] CSOH 101, 2011 SLT 873, which held that on the facts a telephone marriage between parties in Scotland and Pakistan and which was lawful in Pakistan was therefore lawful in Scotland, was wrong (paragraphs 34–40). Whether the purported marriage in the present case was lawfully terminated by a telephone talaq divorce did not strictly speaking arise, but for the sake of completeness the judge held that on the facts the divorce was invalid for the purposes of English law – ie, had the marriage been lawful in the first place. The correct position, as set out in the Home Office Visas and Immigration Guidance 2013 SET 13.5, was that if a husband pronounces talaq divorce in the UK alone (ie, he is not actually in Pakistan or Bangladesh), the divorce will not be recognised (paragraphs 47–48).

Summary

The claimant argued that he should score 15 points in the mobilising descriptor of the work capability assessment. The evidence included that he had been awarded the high rate of the mobility component of disability living allowance for virtual inability to walk. The tribunal rejected that argument, holding that he could walk for 30 metres before 'pausing for a few seconds', then was able to continue walking at a reasonable pace and only needed to rest for more than a 'pause' after covering 100 metres. The tribunal considered that there was a difference between a 'pause' and a stop, in that the former was merely about pacing an activity, whereas the latter created a break in the activity. Thus, it considered that the requirement for 15 points that the claimant cannot mobilise for more than 50 metres 'without stopping in order to avoid significant discomfort or exhaustion' was not satisfied.

Judge Mark allowed the claimant's further appeal and remitted the case for a new tribunal. As was accepted by the Secretary of State, the tribunal had erred in the way it distinguished between a pause and a stop (paragraph 4). For the purpose of the test under consideration, it did not matter if the claimant had to stop for a few seconds or for several minutes. The judge cited at paragraph 21, with approval the decision of Judge Paines QC in GC v SSWP [2014] UKUT 117 (AAC), that in this test there was no distinction between 'stopping' and 'pauses'. In the present case, on its own findings of fact the proper conclusion for the tribunal to have come to was that the claimant would stop for a few seconds after 30 metres (paragraph 5). If that was to avoid significant discomfort or exhaustion (or if a stop for that was required after no more than 50 metres), the appropriate conclusion would be that he could not mobilise on foot for more than 50 metres without stopping for that reason.

However, the judge also pointed out that the test also considered ability to mobilise using a manual wheelchair. So, the tribunal would also need to consider whether and for how far the claimant could reasonably use a manual wheelchair. The tribunal had made no reference to this (paragraph 6).

Decision in brief

Conversion and termination decisions under the Employment and Support Allowance (Transitional Provisions, Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit) (Existing Awards) (No.2) Regulations 2010 No.1907 are valid – argument that they are ultra vires as purporting to alter decisions other than by supersession under the Social Security Act 1998 rejected – the regulations do not purport to amend the 1998 Act, but instead provide for termination of existing awards of incapacity benefits otherwise than by revision or supersession, as clearly provided for in Schedule 4 Welfare Reform Act 2007 – regulations include an entirely adequate right of appeal

Decision in brief

Swedish claimant in receipt of Swedish pension moved to UK and claimed attendance allowance – Article 6 of EC Regulation 987/2009 deals with procedure – claimant is to be provisionally entitled to benefit from one of the states – where the claimant is not working, provisional entitlement arises under the legislation of the state of residence – states may refer the matter to the Administrative Commission – in present decision, Judge Jacobs does not decide who is competent state as the issue arises in other cases currently before him

Summary

The claimant went to the official (gov.uk) website to claim JSA online. Due to a prompt on the website suggesting to the claimant that he could be better off claiming pension credit (PC) and asking if he would like to consider a claim for that 'or continue with this application for jobseeker's allowance', the claimant eventually ended up claiming PC. Only when that had been refused did he complete a claim for JSA. The First-tier Tribunal accepted that his JSA claim should be backdated to the time he originally started to make a JSA claim, holding that on the facts that regulation 19(5)(d) of the Social Security (Claims and Payments) Regulations 1987 No.1968 applied. That provides that a claim for JSA or income support can be backdated for up to three months where 'the claimant was given information by an officer of the Department for Work and Pensions... which led the claimant to believe that a claim for benefit would not succeed.'

Judge Wright allowed the Secretary of State's further appeal, and remitted the case to a new tribunal. However, that was only on the basis that the tribunal had given inadequate reasons about precisely how the claimant came to be of the view that the JSA claim could not succeed. He upheld the tribunal's substantive finding that the information on the DWP website could amount to information from an officer of the DWP, and held that on the facts of the case the tribunal did not err in finding that the claimant had 'been given information by an officer of the DWP' (paragraph 8).

In so holding, he held that the earlier decision of Judge Wikeley in S K-G v SSWP (JSA) [2014] UKUT 430 (AAC) was wrongly decided and should not be followed (paragraph 6). That decision held that information on the website did not constitute information given by an officer of the DWP as it lacked the requisite 'interchange of some kind between the officer and the enquirer'. In particular, Judge Wright took into account evidence that the DWP is responsible for the accuracy of the information on the website (paragraph 20) and that it had been held in R(IS) 3/01 and that the words in regulation 19(5)(d) 'are not to be given any artificially restricted meaning' (paragraph 31) . The words 'by an officer of the DWP' referred to the status of who provided the information, not how it was provided; the requirement in S K-G that there had to be some sort of personalised, specific interchange between the claimant and the DWP did artificially restrict the meaning of the words and so was inconsistent with previous caselaw (paragraphs 26-31 ).

Summary

The claimant had an appeal before the First-tier Tribunal concerning a challenge to a decision refusing to change her award of disability living allowance (DLA) following a change of circumstances. The hearing was adjourned due to the tribunal running out of time, with a date set for resumption on a date some two months later. While the appeal was adjourned, the claimant, having sought advice, gave written notice of withdrawal of her appeal. However, the tribunal considered that its consent was required before withdrawal could be granted, refused to allow withdrawal and went on to decide that the claimant had no entitlement to DLA.

Judge Knowles QC allowed the claimant's further appeal, and substituted a decision that she had lawfully withdrawn her appeal. Therefore, the tribunal's decision that she had no entitlement to DLA was of no effect. The tribunal had erred in deciding that its consent was required before the appeal could be withdrawn. Rather, held the judge, a withdrawal sent by written notice was under a rule giving an absolute right to withdraw, which applies even if a hearing had commenced but subsequently been adjourned (paragraphs 2 and 35). Although consent is required where the request to withdraw is made during a hearing, the tribunal was wrong to regard a hearing as still taking place during an adjournment (paragraph 36).

The relevant rule was at rule 17(1 )(a) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008 No.2685. That provides that a party may give notice of withdrawal (ie, without a need for consent) 'by sending or delivering to the Tribunal a written notice of withdrawal'. However, under subparagraphs (2) and (3)(c), where notice is given 'at a hearing', the tribunal must consent to the withdrawal. In the present case, the judge held that withdrawal under subparagraph (1)(a) (ie, by written notice and not at the hearing) 'gives a party an absolute right to withdraw' (paragraph 35). The tribunal was wrong to regard the claimant's withdrawal to have been made 'at a hearing'. A hearing is defined as 'an oral hearing' and there was no such hearing taking place when the withdrawal was notified, in which case the withdrawal took immediate effect (paragraph 36). In so holding, the judge held that the decision in BP v SSWP (DLA) [2011] UKUT 228 (AAC) was no longer good authority on the interpretation of rule 17, and the decision of Judge Hemingway in LC v SSWP [2015] UKUT 315 (AAC), holding that there was an absolute right to withdraw during an adjournment, was approved (paragraph 40). The only caveat was that rule 17(3)(b) provides that a tribunal can issue a direction that withdrawal may take effect only with the tribunal's consent. So, for example, in the present case the tribunal could have issued such a direction when it adjourned, with the effect of providing that consent was required - however, it did not (paragraph 37).

Summary

On conversion of his claim for incapacity benefit to contributory ESA, the claimant was placed in the work-related activity group. At that time, he was resident in Spain. He appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. He did not request a hearing and the tribunal decided the case on the papers. In rejecting the appeal, the tribunal considered the application of the 'substantial risk' provision for work-related activity at regulation 35(2) of the Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008 No. 794. The tribunal found that as the claimant lived abroad, work-related activity for him a 'hypothetical consideration' as he would not actually be required to undertake such activity while resident abroad.

Judge Mitchell allowed the claimant's further appeal and remitted the case to a new tribunal. The claimant did not have a fair opportunity to put forward a case in relation to regulation 35(2) because he was unaware of the type of work-related activity by reference to which the regulation would be applied (paragraph 20). The tribunal had no information from the Secretary of State about the type of work-related activity it considered could be carried out without substantial risk.

The judge asked the Secretary of State to provide a submission about how regulation 35(2) should be applied in a case where the claimant was resident outside Great Britain, in particular with regard to the requirement that the tribunal would have information about the work-related activity that might be required in a particular geographical area. The Secretary of State replied that in a case where the claimant chose not to attend a hearing, it would almost always take place in Newcastle (where the DWP international pension centre was based): therefore, in such a case the relevant evidence would be from the Newcastle area. Where the claimant chose to attend the hearing in person, s/he could choose a venue suitable to her/him, in which case the relevant evidence would come from the area in which the tribunal was located. Judge Mitchell held that if the appellant does not object, the Secretary of State's approach should be adopted; if the appellant does object to that, then the tribunal needs 'to decide for itself how to proceed taking into account the reasons for the objection and any submissions of the Secretary of State' (paragraphs 16- 22).